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ABSTRACT 
To legitimize itself as a scientific discipline, the software 
engineering academic community must let go of its non-empirical 
dogmas. A dogma is belief held regardless of evidence. This paper 
analyzes the nature and detrimental effects of four software 
engineering dogmas – 1) the belief that software has 
“requirements”; 2) the division of software engineering tasks into 
analysis, design, coding and testing; 3) the belief that software 
engineering is predominantly concerned with designing 
“software” systems; 4) the belief that software engineering 
follows methods effectively. Deconstructing these dogmas reveals 
that they each oversimplify and over-rationalize aspects of 
software engineering practice, which obscures underlying 
phenomena and misleads researchers and practitioners. 
Evidenced-based practice is analyzed as a means to expose and 
repudiate non-empirical dogmas. This analysis results in several 
novel recommendations for overcoming the practical challenges 
of evidence-based practice.  
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
D.2.0, D.2.1, D.2.10 [Software Engineering]: General, 
Requirements Specifications, Design Methodologies. 
General Terms 
Design, Human Factors, Theory. 
Keywords 
Empiricism, Empirical Software Engineering, Evidenced-Based 
Software Engineering, Requirements, Methods. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
If you can't make engineering decisions based on data, 
then make engineering decisions that result in data.  
-Kent Beck 
Bats are not blind. Sunflowers do not turn with the sun. Shaving 
does not make hair grow back thicker. Bulls are not enraged by 
the color red. Humans are not limited to five senses. Stomach 
ulcers are not caused by stress. Lemmings do not mindlessly 
follow each other off cliffs. Deoxygenated blood is not blue. 
Water does not drain in opposite directions in the northern and 
southern hemispheres. And Thomas Edison did not invent the 
lightbulb. The prevalence of these and other common 
misconceptions [1] leads us to wonder what misconceptions might 
concern software engineering (SE). 
Of course, not all misconceptions are equally important. Some 
misconceptions are easily rectified, e.g., most people confronted 
with the idea that our sense of equilibrioception (balance) does not 
classify neatly into the traditional five senses willingly revise their 
belief about us having just five senses. In contrast, some beliefs 
persist regardless of evidence, e.g., faced with extensive evidence 
of climate change many people continue to believe it is an 
elaborate hoax. When a belief is held regardless of evidence, it 
becomes a dogma. Moreover, some dogmas and misconceptions 
are basically harmless, while others, e.g., the belief that vaccines 
cause autism, can be fatal. We can therefore narrow our scope and 
propose the following research question: 
Research Question: What dangerous dogmas pervade the 
software engineering discourse? 
Here, a dangerous dogma is a belief that harms researchers or 
practitioners in some way and resists empirical challenge. The 
ICSE 2014 call for submissions (http://2014.icse-
conferences.org/research) explicitly invites “papers that assess the 
state of the art in the field, its research trajectory, and core 
assumptions that may or may not hold in the future” (italics 
added). This paper consequently examines several core 
assumptions (dogmas) in software engineering (SE) that endure 
despite being logically problematic and contrary to many 
empirical observations.  
Exploring these dogmas is important as they fundamentally 
undermine SE practice and research. The SE discipline can only 
progress if practitioners and researchers are willing to recognise 
dangerous dogmas and modify their beliefs according to the 
empirical evidence.  
 
We therefore proceed by identifying and deconstructing some of 
SE’s dangerous dogmas (§2). We then explain how SE might 
transcend dogmas by moving toward evidenced-based practice 
(§3). Section 4 concludes the paper by summarizing its 
contributions and limitations.  
2. UNEMPIRICAL DOGMAS OF 
SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 
In this section we discuss four dangerous dogmas in SE. In each 
case we identify a commonly-held belief, demonstrate that it is a 
dogma by showing how it is both logically problematic and 
contradicted by empirical evidence, discuss the continuing appeal 
of the dogma and then explain how it is harmful. 
2.1. Software Systems are Designed to 
Satisfy Requirements  
It is widely believed that software systems are designed to satisfy 
requirements, where a requirement is a feature or property of a 
system that is necessary for success [2], [3]. Belief in software 
requirements is evident in educational curricula [4]-[6], textbooks, 
industry standards [7], [8], bodies of knowledge (e.g. [3]), 
software development methods [9]-[11] and the extensive 
literature on requirements engineering. The idea of specifying 
requirements independently of designing and building a system is 
solidified by management pressure to outsource, conceptualize 
development as independent phases (§2.2) and make enforceable 
contracts [12]. However, the idea that software systems are 
designed to satisfy requirements axiom is logically problematic in 
several ways.  
First, if a requirement is something necessary for success, stating 
a set of requirements implies that we know what success means. 
In real projects, however, system goals are often unknown, 
ambiguous or disagreed on by stakeholders [13]. Rather, 
developers are faced with a situation that is perceived as 
problematic by different stakeholders in different ways [14]. If 
success is not understood or agreed, stating conditions necessary 
to produce the unknown success state is difficult if not impossible.  
Second, even if success in the target domain is well understood, 
requirements elicitation may not produce requirements. Most 
people cannot produce statements that are “correct”, 
“unambiguous”, “complete” and “consistent” as the IEEE-830 
standard [8, p. 4] recommends, even with expert help [12]. In the 
best case, the user hypothesizes that a feature is a necessary 
condition for success. However, the user may be incorrect in at 
least three ways – 1) the system could succeed without the feature; 
2) the feature is inferior to an alternative not considered by the 
stakeholder; 3) the feature actually has a negative effect on system 
success. Perhaps more often, requirements elicitation identifies 
things users vaguely want or abstract goals. For example, in a 
study of a virtual learning environment (VLE) implementation, 
some users requested running two VLEs simultaneously despite 
multiple VLEs being identified as the primary problem with the 
status quo [13].  
Third, designing involves manipulating elements whose 
interactions are not completely understood [15] or predictable 
[16]. In any realistically complex system, it may be impossible to 
tell whether any “requirement” is actually needed to achieve a 
particular goal or even whether it will have a positive effect. This 
is especially problematic as the word ‘requirement’ and the IEEE 
standard “the systems shall” phrasing both connote certainty.  
Fourth, even if we clearly understand exactly what a system needs 
to accomplish, there may still be no requirements. Requirements 
are properties common to every system that will achieve a set of 
goals. If a goal can be accomplished by two systems, one with 
password-based identification and the other with biometric 
identification, then neither form of identification is a requirement, 
because there exists a potential solution with a different form. In 
situations when several heterogeneous solutions are evident, there 
may be too little in common to form a useful set of requirements. 
Moreover, supposing the developer has identified three workable 
solutions, in many contexts there is no way to know whether an 
unimagined fourth solution is still out there – a solution so 
different from current solutions as to invalidate any meaningful 
requirements (cf. [17]).  
Furthermore, the idea that software systems are designed to satisfy 
requirements is contrary to many empirical observations [13]. 
Empirical studies of design professionals in many fields reveal 
that, in practice, design decisions are not driven by requirements 
specifications [18]-[20]. Rather, designers habitually treat 
problems as ill-defined, explore problems using solution 
conjectures and adjust goals and constraints as they go [18]. 
Research on creativity in requirements engineering (cf. [21]) is 
actually demonstrating that most “requirements” are actually 
design decisions.  
However, the belief that software development is about satisfying 
requirements is intuitively appealing in several ways. First, it 
allows developers to offload much of the hard work of 
determining what to build – if the client provides faulty 
requirements, that’s their problem. Second, it facilitates the logic 
of outsourcing – if no requirements are evident what would be the 
basis for outsourcing or tendering contracts? Third, a requirements 
specification conceals the innate tensions, disagreements and 
paradoxes within the problematic context, which eases 
developers’ cognitive loads. Consequently, many practitioners and 
academics believe so strongly that requirements are central to SE 
that faced with the serious conceptual and empirical challenges 
identified above, they simply argue that meeting explicit 
requirements is the very definition of success. This oversimplified 
view of success has been thoroughly rejected in the project 
management literature, where success is now understood to 
include not only meeting schedule, budget and scope goals but 
also impacts on diverse stakeholders, market performance and 
learning [22]-[25].  
Dogmatic adherence to the idea that design is driven by 
requirements is dangerous. First, it supports deleterious forms of 
tendering, outsourcing and contracting based on illusory 
requirements [12], [17]. When the outsourcee realizes that the 
specified system is not what the client really needs, they have 
three options: A) deliver an ineffective system that satisfies the 
contract but disappoints the client; B) deliver a better system, 
possibly at greater cost, and risk contractual penalties or a breach 
of contract lawsuit; or C) spend considerable time, resources and 
political capital trying to renegotiate the contract. Second, 
overconfidence in epistemically uncertain requirements likely 
interferes with developer creativity via myriad cognitive 
phenomena including myside bias, system justification, 
confirmation bias, default bias and design fixation [26]-[30]. Put 
simply, as requirements narrow the solution space, failing to 
question bad requirements may eliminate good designs. Finally, 
appreciation of the tensions, paradoxes and disagreements that are 
concealed by the requirements specification may be crucial for 
devising a good system.  
2.2. Royce’s Ontology is a Good Way of 
Conceptualizing Development Activity  
Sim and Duffy [31] identified numerous generic engineering 
activities including “abstracting”, “associating”, “defining”, 
“selecting”, “searching”, “scheduling” and “prioritizing.” To 
reduce cognitive load and facilitate description, SE academics and 
practitioners organize these activities into higher level categories. 
For example, Table 1 shows overlapping categories between a 
curriculum guideline (SE2004 [4]), a process model (Waterfall 
[10]) a body of knowledge document (SWEBOK [3]), a system 
development method (RUP [32]) and Wikipedia’s popular 
Software Development Process Template sidebar [33]. While each 
attempt produces minor variations and some are more 
comprehensive than others, categories equivalent to requirements, 
analysis, design, coding and testing consistently emerge. 
Although, the linear progression between phases dedicated to each 
category (as in Royce’s Waterfall Model) is now widely 
recognized as idealistic, the categories themselves constitute a 
kind of implicit process theory, which we call Royce’s Ontology. 
SE academics and practitioners widely take these categories for 
granted, i.e., they assume that Royce’s Ontology is a good way of 
conceptualizing software development activity.  
In Royce’s Ontology, analysis refers to “detailed examination or 
study of something so as to determine its nature, structure, or 
essential features” and “breaking up of a complex whole into its 
basic elements or constituent parts” [34]. Design refers to 
specifying an object that is intended to accomplish goals in an 
environment, subject to constraints, where specifying could mean 
planning, prototyping or building the design object [35]. Coding 
refers to producing software programs and functions. Testing 
refers to evaluating properties (e.g. reliability, efficiency) of a 
software system (including its components and auxiliary artifacts) 
at different levels of analysis (e.g. unit, system, business).  
Royce’s Ontology is intuitively appealing in many ways. It is 
relatively simple and easy to teach. It employs everyday language, 
which is consistent with much of the SE literature, especially the 
methods literature (§2.4). However, it is also logically problematic 
and at odds with empirical evidence. 
Requirements is a core activity in Royce’s Ontology, yet, as 
discussed above, many projects have insufficient requirements to 
drive design. The remaining elements of analysis, plus design, 
coding and testing, in contrast, are not so fundamentally flawed; 
rather, it is conceptually decoupling them that is inconsistent with 
both empirical observation and recommended practice.  
Extensive empirical research shows that conceptually decoupling 
analysis and design is problematic. Empirical studies demonstrate 
that professional designers and developers do “not keep means 
and ends separate”; rather, problem framing and problem solving 
are simultaneous and inextricably intertwined [20, p. 69]. 
Designers explore the problem space by generating design 
candidates and building software artifacts [18]. Developers’ 
understanding of the problematic context and space of potential 
solutions co-evolve [18], [19], [36], [37]. Designers use solution 
conjectures better to understand problems [20].  
Separating analysis, design and coding from testing is also 
illogical as testing may involve analysis, design and coding. 
Obviously, someone has to design the tests. With unit tests, for 
example, someone has to analyze the situation and design and 
code the tests. Furthermore, when a developer runs a code 
segment through a unit test suite and receives an error, sometimes 
the error is in the code, but other times it is in the test. Therefore, 
testing becomes entangled with coding and developers correct the 
test suite and the code through a mutual debugging process.  
Furthermore, different kinds of testing are interconnected with 
design and coding. During coding, developers may employ 
myriad testing practices and tools including peer code reviews, 
static analysis tools and a debugger. Designers, especially visual 
designers, may employ user acceptance testing on lightweight 
prototypes and mockups to elicit user needs and preferences.  
Similarly, conceptually decoupling design and coding implies that 
practitioners design systems without building them. Civil 
engineers and architects, among others, do this regularly. They 
can create sophisticated, mathematical models of contemporary 
structures accurately predicting how these structures will react to 
various loads, wind conditions and earthquakes. They can be 
reasonably confident of how their designs will behave prior to 
building them. Software engineers, in contrast, often develop 
complex systems – systems that exhibit properties not obvious 
from their constituent parts [16], [38]. As complex systems exhibit 
unpredictable behaviors, the only way to explore the design space 
is to build prototypes [13], [39]-[41].  
Two interpretations of these logical and empirical challenges to 
Royce’s Ontology are evident – one superficial and one deep. The 
superficial and unsurprising interpretation is that analysis, design, 
etc. are not mutually exclusive activities.  
The less obvious, more fundamental conclusion is that Royce’s 
Ontology is a dangerous dogma because its vernacular (not just 
the implied linearity of Waterfall) is defective and misleading. In 
Royce’s Ontology, analysis etc. are categories of activities. 
“However, categories are useful only if they make it possible to 
infer further information, and only if they do so consistently” [42, 
p. 1040]. As Royce’s categories are so overlapping (e.g. analysis 
and design) and contain such disparate activities (e.g. debugging 
vs. acceptance testing), we cannot draw meaningful inferences. 
For instance, if we know that “John is testing”, we cannot infer 
whether John is an analyst, tester or programmer, whether he is 
working with a user, source code, a low-fidelity prototype, a 
debugger or a client, or whether this activity is automated or 
manual. Royce’s Ontology is dangerous in several ways. For 
practitioners, conceptually separating analysis, design, etc. 
suggests that they can also be divided temporally, geographically 
or individually; e.g., we can do the analysis this month and start 
design next month, we can do the requirements in our UK office 
and coding in our Canadian office, our main team can develop the 
system while our quality assurance specialists handle the testing. 
While experienced practitioners may know such divisions are 
tenuous, remembering that the testers do some of the analysis and 
the analysts handle some of the testing requires a kind of perpetual 
doublethink. Meanwhile, the whole point of aggregating basic 
activities including “abstracting”, “associating”, “defining” and 
“selecting” into higher level categories including analysis and 
testing was to reduce cognitive load. 
 
Table 1: Influence of Royce’s Ontology 
Waterfall SE2004 SWEBOK RUP Disciplines Wikipedia 
  SE Economics   
  Software Configuration Management   
 Computing Essentials Computing Foundations   
 Mathematical and Engineering Fundamentals Mathematical Foundations   
 Professional Practice SE Professional Practice   
System Requirements 
Software Modeling and Analysis 
 Business Modelling 
Requirements 
Software Requirements Software Requirements Requirements 
Analysis  
Analysis and Design 
 
Program Design Software Design Software Design 
Architecture 
Design 
Coding  Software Construction Implementation Construction 
Testing 
Verification and Validation 
Software Testing Test 
Testing 
Software Quality Debugging 
Operations Software Evolution Software Maintenance Deployment 
Deployment 
Maintenance 
 Software Process SE Models and Methods   
 Software Management SE Management   
 
For researchers, poor classification of SE activities obscures the 
many fundamental SE phenomena that do not neatly map onto 
Royce’s Ontology. For example, coevolution is a fundamental SE 
phenomenon where an engineer’s attention oscillates between 
aspects of a problematic context and a space of possible solutions, 
gradually improving his or her understanding of each [18], [19], 
[37]. Despite coevolution being fundamental to thinking in the 
design discipline [18], [43], [44] it is barely mentioned in the SE 
methods literature or model curricula [6]. Consequently, Royce’s 
Ontology inhibits understanding and application of alternative 
theories of software development, including Sensemaking-
Coevolution-Implementation Theory [13], [36], [45], [46], which 
attempts to organize SE activities into more cohesive, less 
overlapping categories.  
2.3. Software Engineers Design Software 
The official IEEE definition of software engineering reads in part, 
“the application of a systematic, disciplined, quantifiable approach 
to the development, operation, and maintenance of software” [47]. 
The assertion that SE practitioners design and build software 
systems appears so uncontroversial that it is rarely questioned. 
However, asserting that SE is only about software implies that 
software design is fundamentally different and separate from 
hardware design and social system design. We even invented the 
term virtual to distinguish software artifacts from their material 
counterparts, i.e., the hardware systems used by the software and 
the social systems that use the software. This virtual-material 
dualism comprises two basic assumptions: 
1. Software systems are fundamentally different from the 
hardware systems they run on 
2. Application software is fundamentally different from the 
social systems that use it 
Virtual-material dualism is appealing in many ways. From the 
perspective of an application developer, both hardware and social 
systems are often predetermined or relatively unchangeable. 
Conceptual boundaries drawn around the virtual software coincide 
with conceptual boundaries between what is and is not under the 
developer’s control. Imagining these as non-permeable boundaries 
helps developers manage project complexity, scope creep and 
cognitive load. Similarly, from the perspective of an application 
user, events occurring on-screen do not appear as real as events in 
the physical world. In video games, for instance, many of us 
perform actions for fun that would be clinically traumatic in the 
real world. Moreover, many users readily distinguish between 
hardware and application software errors; e.g., when a tablet 
application gives an error, we first contact the people who made 
the application, not the people who made the tablet. However, 
virtual-material dualism is logically problematic in several ways.  
First, by designing application and enterprise software, developers 
often implicitly design parts of the social system where the 
software will be implemented. For example, at the time of writing, 
the plagiarism detection system Turnitin allows teachers to grade 
papers while easily switching between original and originality-
analysis views. However, the student’s name is visible in all 
views, preventing anonymous grading. In this way, Turnitin’s 
design exerts influence on the broader social system. Of course, 
the user can work around Turnitin’s design by downloading and 
anonymizing the papers; however, Turnitin’s designers have still 
implied an intended design dimension of the social system. In this 
way, the design artifact boundary may not align with the virtual-
material boundary. Similarly, when a company adopts enterprise 
resource planning software, it is often easier to adjust business 
process to the software than to adjust the software to existing 
business processes [48]. This dynamic gives software developers 
substantial control over business processes.  
Second, in some contexts hardware and software design are 
tightly connected. For example, to develop the Chromebook, 
Google simultaneously developed an operating system (linux-
based ChromeOS) and a reference hardware design (the CR-48 
prototype). Clearly the hardware design influenced the software 
design, e.g., USB ports necessitate software drivers. However, the 
software design also influenced the hardware design, e.g., due to 
the web-centric nature of ChromeOS, the CR-48 keyboard 
replaced the caps lock button with a dedicated search button. 
Other examples include many embedded systems (e.g. traffic 
lights) where hardware-software co-design is common [49]. Here 
again the boundary between the design artifact and its context 
does not align with the virtual-material boundary.  
Third, the system boundaries perceived by users may not align 
with the virtual-material boundary. For example, when a non-
technical user cannot connect to WiFi, he or she does not readily 
distinguish between the modem, modem firmware, router, router 
firmware, network protocols, local wireless hardware, wireless 
drivers and the browser. The non-technical user lumps them all 
together into a single system by saying ‘the Internet is broken’. 
The system boundary is perceived between “the Internet” and the 
user, not between the hardware and the software. Similarly, 
pervasive games often combine material and virtual activity [50]. 
The boundary between the game world and the “real” world is 
therefore not aligned with the virtual/material boundary [51]. 
Neither the idea of hardware-software co-design nor the idea of 
the design artifact being a sociotechnical system rather than purely 
software are new [14], [49], [52]. However, outside of particular 
subfields (e.g. embedded systems, information systems) both SE 
practitioners and academics often appear to act as though software 
development is fundamentally disconnected from hardware and 
social systems. Some have even argued that modern software 
complexity is rooted in hardware designer’s propensity to leave all 
but the most basic operations to software [53]. Moreover, diverse 
research on designing human activity systems (e.g. [14], [54]) 
including work systems (e.g. [52], [55]) and service systems (e.g. 
[56]) has had limited impact on standard curricula or bodies of 
knowledge (cf. [3], [4]). Industrial design and business process 
design, for example, appear rare in SE educational, theoretical and 
practical discourse. Even increasing interest in user experience 
design does not go as far as rejecting virtual-material duality and 
recognize that designing the work software may entail designing 
the work system that employs it [57]. Yet designing the work 
system through the software is exactly what SAP and other 
enterprise resource planning software appears to do. 
The virtual-material duality dogma is dangerous in at least two 
ways. First, failing to consider the complex interaction between a 
human activity system and the software systems that support it 
can have serious consequences. For example, the software-based 
Integrated Children’s System was developed to support social 
workers in the UK. “By attempting to micro-manage work 
through a rigid performance management regime, and a centrally 
prescribed practice model”, the Integrated Children’s System “has 
disrupted the professional task, engendering a range of unsafe 
practices” [58, p. 405]. The software effectively created a toxic 
environment that increased the probability of tragedies including 
the death of the 17-month-old British boy known as Baby P [59]. 
In this instance, the software not only was ineffective but also 
actively damaged the design of the human activity system. 
Second, conflating software and design artifact may 
unintentionally and unnecessarily narrow the solution space, 
handicapping innovation. Suppose a software developer 
distinguishes between three kinds of systems – hardware, software 
and social – and equates the software system with the design 
artifact. When designing, however, the important boundary is 
between design artifact and context; i.e., what the designer can 
and cannot manipulate. This may lead developers to create 
complex, expensive software solutions where simple, economical 
hardware or social changes would suffice. Similarly for 
researchers, defining the design artifact as software independently 
of a particular context may obscure important social dimensions 
of software adoption and implementation, e.g., enterprise system 
implementation failing because the organization did not make the 
needed business process changes rather than because of particular 
features of the software.  
The virtual-material duality dogma may have even more subtle 
and insidious consequences. Default bias is a common 
psychological tendency to select options which are presented as 
the default or status quo [26], [60]. The combination of time 
constraints, default bias and simple laziness gives software 
developers often unrecognized power to influence user behavior. 
Rather than explicitly designing human activity system, software 
developers can implicitly manipulate human behavior by making 
preferred actions easier or framing them as defaults. For instance, 
if Turnitin made anonymous grading the default option, many 
more academics would likely take that route. This presents two 
interconnected dangers – 1) negative unintended consequences of 
design decisions, 2) intentional manipulation of users. Of course, 
these are difficult to distinguish from the outside – we do not 
know whether Turnitin’s developers are implementing a 
principled stance against anonymous marking or if it is simply an 
unintended consequence.  
2.4. Methods are Used, Effective and 
Generalizable 
The concept of a system development method(ology), or simply a 
method, occupies a deeply privileged position in the academic 
discourse [61]. A method (e.g. Scrum, Lean, Crystal, Kanban, 
Rational Unified Process, PRINCE2) is a collection of 
interconnected, complex, abstract prescriptions concerning how to 
build a system effectively and connotes “an orderly, predictable 
and universal approach” [61, p. 54]. The concept of method thus 
entails three assumptions – 1) methods are used, 2) using a 
method positively affects SE success, 3) each method generalizes 
to a range of contexts (not that one method can be effective in 
every conceivable project, just that a method applies to many 
projects).  
Although common in the literature (cf. [3], [4], [61]-[67]), these 
assumptions are so rudimentary that they are rarely stated 
explicitly. However, they are clearly fundamental assumptions of 
method engineering (e.g. [68]), software process improvement 
(e.g. [69] )and process maturity (e.g. [70]).  
The assumptions that methods are used, effective and 
generalizable are intuitively appealing in several ways. Methods 
can be thought of as being similar to tools: a debugger, for 
instance, is clearly used, often effective and applicable to myriad 
software projects. Methods can be thought of as being similar to 
algorithms: collaborative filtering, for example, is used by 
recommender systems, is fairly effective and applies to a wide 
range of item classes. Finally methods can be thought of as being 
similar to highly structured procedures in other domains; for 
instance, a banker may follow a precise procedure to determine 
whether a client is eligible for a particular mortgage.  
However, conceptualizing methods as similar to tools, algorithms 
and procedures is logically problematic, since methods are 
fundamentally different. A method is a collection of 
interconnected, complex, abstract prescriptions. As methods are 
collections, developers may choose to follow some of the 
prescriptions some of the time. As prescriptions are complex, 
developers may partially comply; e.g., peer programming is not 
simply having two developers share a workstation [11]. As 
prescriptions are abstract, they may be instantiated differently in 
different contexts; e.g., working out how to conduct a daily stand-
up meeting (Scrum) in a geographically distributed team.  
Unsurprisingly, then, substantial empirical research demonstrates 
that methods are neither effectively nor extensively used [71]-
[76], rarely used as intended [73]-[78] and almost never 
empirically validated [62]. Developers may claim to follow a 
method or even fake adherence while practically ignoring it [65], 
[72], [79]}. Similar methods in similar situations may produce 
opposite results [80] while specific methods may be unsuitable for 
certain individuals [81]. Organizations may change so quickly that 
any long-term method becomes ineffective [67], [82]. Rather than 
use methods, practitioners create “methods-in-use” [83], which 
significantly differ from methods(-in-books). Moreover, 
practitioners often deviate from methods not from ignorance but 
from recognition of the method’s misalignment with their context 
[75], [78]. This has led many to the conclusion that methods are 
fictions (e.g. [61], [79], [84]). Yet the methods are used, effective 
and generalizable dogma remains despite being logically 
problematic and contradicted by substantial empirical evidence.  
Method-fictions may be useful for practitioners in that trying to 
apply them produces more rational design processes [79]. 
However, method-fictions, and this dogma, are also dangerous. 
First, many method-fictions foster an over-rationalized worldview 
that obscures fundamental SE phenomena including improvisation 
[13], [85]-[87], amethodical development [61], [67] and goal 
disagreement. Second, method-fictions contribute to a non-
empirical culture within SE. When mechanical engineering 
researchers design a new piston, they are expected to provide 
empirical evidence that the new piston outperforms existing 
pistons, but when SE researchers develop a new method, no one 
expects them to empirically demonstrate the new method’s 
superiority to existing methods. This has led to a proliferation of 
thousands of methods [64], [88] with little empirical knowledge of 
their relative efficacy [62]. Third, the privileged status of method 
in the literature leads researchers to theorize on the basis of 
method-fictions rather than empirical realities. For example, 
Sjøberg et al. present a theory of “UML-based development” 
which posits that “the use of a UML-based method increases costs 
[and] … positively affects communication, … design, … 
documentation … [and] testability” [89, p. 323]. This formulation 
glosses over the empirical reality that, in practice, UML is used 
rarely, selectively and informally [74], [75]. While their 
hypotheses are not necessarily wrong, they are based on an 
oversimplified notion of use, which obscures the diversity of 
interactions between UML concepts and real-world development. 
Finally, methods, or method-fictions, constitute an accumulation 
of other dogmas, such as those we have discussed in this section; 
many of the methods prescribe that software systems should be 
designed to satisfy pre-defined system requirements, utilize 
Royce’s Ontology and encourage a virtual-material dualism. They 
also serve to disseminate such dogmas further as SE practitioners 
and researchers move to adopt the methods, thus encouraging a 
persistent belief in SE dogmas.  
3. EVIDENCE-BASED SOFTWARE 
ENGINEERING 
The previous section discussed some core assumptions in SE that 
have endured despite being logically problematic and contrary to 
many empirical observations. One factor that may substantially 
contribute to the resilience of these dogmas is the gap between SE 
research and practice, which continues to widen due to “a 
tremendous lack of empirical evidence regarding the benefits and 
limitations of new SE methods and tools on both sides” [90, p. 
13]. Currently SE researchers may design tools and methods 
without knowing that they do not work well when adopted by 
practitioners, and practitioners may adopt tools and methods 
without knowing that they did not work well for other adopters. 
Widely-held dogmas provide a sense of security that “everyone 
does it like this”. This section therefore discusses one approach to 
close the research-practice gap and rejuvenate empiricism on both 
sides – evidence-based practice (EBP).  
3.4. Evidence-Based Practice 
EBP, in its simplest sense, refers to a form of professional activity 
where practical decisions are based on empirical research. In 
reality however, EBP is a relationship between communities of 
researchers and practitioners comprising roughly three parts – 1) 
empirical research on practically relevant problems, 2) systematic 
literature reviews (SLRs, below) written for non-academics, 3) 
professional activity guided by SLR conclusions. Successful EBP 
therefore requires two forms of ‘readiness’ [91] – researchers 
ready to study areas of concern to practitioners, and practitioners 
ready to integrate scientific evidence into their practice. 
An SLR analyzes and synthesizes published empirical studies 
concerning a method, tool or technology to establish the evidence 
for its effectiveness. The search strategy for discovering primary 
empirical research is made traceable and repeatable (e.g. all search 
terms and databases used are listed), the criteria for deciding 
which studies are of high-enough quality to be included in the 
synthesis are defined and applied, and the findings of the high-
quality empirical studies are synthesized so that conclusions can 
be drawn about the effectiveness in-use of the artifact under 
consideration [92]. SLR summaries are often written for 
practitioners in non-academic language. 
EBP originated in medicine. For improving practitioners’ 
decision-making, which had previously been based on habit, 
prejudice or imperfect knowledge of relevant research [93], 
evidenced-based medicine is considered one of the most important 
medical innovations since 1840 [94]. As doctors often lack the 
time or skills to process multitudinous papers largely written by 
academics for academics, EBP forms the aforementioned three-
stage process. First, medical researchers conduct and publish basic 
and applied studies in formats largely intended for other 
researchers. Second, researchers conduct SLRs and publish non-
academic summaries in a free, open, international, online 
knowledgebase (the Cochrane Collaboration; www.cochrane.org). 
Finally, doctors combine guidance from the knowledgebase with 
the values and preferences of patients to determine the best 
treatment [93].  
Of course evidence-based practice is not without controversy. For 
example, it is dependent on the quality of empirical evidence 
produced, and it may be criticized for bias toward experimental 
evidence and sensitivity to publication bias [95]. While Cochrane 
reviews, for example, are generally better than industry-supported 
reviews [96], some Cochrane reviews still overstate the empirical 
support for treatments [97]. EBP is also criticized for preventing 
physicians from tailoring treatments for specific cases; however, 
this reflects a common misunderstanding of EBP – EBP creates 
guidelines, not rules, which practitioners are expected to adjust for 
unique circumstances (Figure 1).  
Despite some criticism, EBP has expanded beyond purely clinical 
treatments to healthcare management and policy; e.g., strategies to 
change organizational culture to improve healthcare performance 
[98], and approaches for promoting information technology 
adoption by healthcare professionals [99]. EBP has also spread to 
other disciplines, such as social policy [100], librarianship [101] 
and education [102]. The Campbell Collaboration 
(www.campbellcollaboration.org) now houses SLRs in education, 
social welfare and crime and justice. 
 
Figure 1: Overview of Evidenced Based Practice 
3.5. Evidenced Based Software Engineering 
An evidence-based software engineering community (EBSE) has 
also developed, which is exploring how EBP can be adapted for 
SE [103]. Via a series of conference workshops and publications 
this community has promoted EBSE and published SLRs for some 
SE beliefs and practices (e.g. [104], [105]). A web repository for 
EBSE has also been established (www.ebse.org.uk).  
However, EBSE adoption remains slow and limited to a small 
number of enthusiasts. A 2011 study found only 49 SLRs in SE 
since the beginning of 2005, and only half of those contained a 
synthesis of the empirical evidence – the remainder simply 
identified the empirical studies available on a given topic [106]. 
The EBSE repository has apparently not been updated since 
August 2012. Its SLRs have not been summarized for 
practitioners; instead the citation details and abstract of the SLR-
based paper written for academics is provided. Sometimes a one 
or two sentence summary of the review’s findings is included, but 
this is clearly insufficient to support practitioner decision-making.  
A more pronounced movement towards EBSE would facilitate 
differentiating between unempirical dogma and veracious theory. 
Theoretical principles facilitate academic consensus building and 
protect practitioners from con men dressed as “Agile coaches” and 
“software process improvement consultants”. An EBSE culture 
would be a powerful inoculation against the unempirical fads that 
pervade SE [107]. It would also increase pressure to base 
educational curricula on evidence rather than custom and opinion. 
Moreover, EBSE necessarily addresses the research-practice 
knowledge gap as practitioners are familiar with more research 
and researchers face more practical questions. More 
fundamentally, without SLRs we cannot definitively answer even 
simple questions and this impotence breeds dangerous dogmas 
including those above.  
3.6. Recommendations for Progressing 
EBSE 
Transitioning to an EBP paradigm, however, entails myriad 
nontrivial social, political and methodological challenges. To 
move to EBP, researchers need to address practical problems and 
provide more and better empirical evaluations of proposed 
technologies and practices. This means that SE students, 
researchers and reviewers need more and better training in the full 
range of empirical methods appropriate to SE, from surveys and 
experiment to ethnography and action research. Journals and 
conferences must also demand such evidence. The ICSE 2014 call 
for submissions invites methodological papers that “provide 
convincing arguments, with commensurate experiences, why a 
new method is needed and what the benefits of the proposed 
method are.” Arguments and experiences alone are not good 
enough in engineering, management, medicine or psychology – 
we see no good reason for SE to accept a lower standard. For this 
to work, reviewers will also need to focus more on evidence and 
methodology (and less on literature reviews, style and framing). 
Promotion and tenure committees and research funding councils 
should also acknowledge that building and evaluating takes longer 
and represents a greater contribution than building alone.  
More empirical research supports more secondary analysis. 
However, as performing SLRs is methodologically difficult, SE 
researchers need greater training in meta-analysis and thematic 
synthesis. New methods will also be needed, to synthesize the 
heterogeneous data commonly found in empirical SE studies that 
do not originate from randomized controlled trials as used in 
clinical medicine [108], [109]. As conducting and maintaining 
SLRs is time-consuming, promotion and tenure committees and 
research councils must recognize SLRs as major scientific 
contributions.  
SLRs must be summarized in a format suitable for practitioners, 
and should be made freely available via a website, such as the 
EBSE website that has already been initiated. Practitioners need 
exposure to the SLR repository and its benefits, and training in 
how to effectively combine guidelines from SLRs with experience 
and circumstance to act effectively. SE educational programs 
should make the SLR repository the go-to resource for SE 
students. Industry standards and educational curricula should 
reflect not only evidence from SLRs (rather than popular opinion 
and dogmas) but also how to apply SLR guidance in practice.  
As the number of SLRs increases practitioners could increasingly 
base their decisions on the available evidence, combined with 
their knowledge of their own particular context. This will alter 
SE’s implicit model of scientific communication: the current 
reports by researchers for researchers will also be mediated via 
summaries of systematic reviews into an accessible format for 
practitioners, which will bring research and practice much closer 
together. The gap between them could also be bridged if 
researchers more frequently conducted engaged research, i.e., 
empirical studies in practitioner organizations. 
Highly effective EBSE entails even more difficult challenges. For 
example, comparing heterogeneous technologies and practices 
requires common agreement on a top-level dependent variable. 
Intermediate variables including developer productivity, lines of 
code and number of bugs lack the unambiguous finality of 
morbidity and mortality. We therefore need a better understanding 
of what constitutes “software engineering success” [25], [110]. 
Furthermore, the entire academic publishing apparatus 
fundamentally undermines SLR accuracy through publication bias 
[111], leading some to argue for revolutionary changes including 
simply publishing all empirical research [95]. 
This agenda offers the prospect of a SE discipline which requires 
empirical evidence for the efficacy of new technologies and 
practices before their adoption and standardization, and 
emphasizes cumulative knowledge development rather than 
doggedly clinging to dogmas. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper makes two interconnected contributions. First, it 
presents four dogmas, i.e., widespread non-empirical beliefs, 
which pervade the SE discourse despite being logically 
problematic. Our deconstruction of these dogmas suggests the 
following. 
1. In many SE projects the “requirements” are not simply flawed 
but entirely fictitious, and these fictitious requirements mislead 
and undermine good design. 
2. Conceptually organizing SE activity into categories including 
analysis, design, coding and testing is confusing because these 
categories are not mutually exclusive and do not support 
inferences about their component activities. 
3. Conceptually demarcating the software from hardware and 
human activity systems may lead to unnecessarily complex 
software, reduced innovation and unintended consequences. 
4. System development methods are fictions that impair research 
and practice by over-rationalizing, oversimplifying and 
obscuring paradoxes, conflicts and improvisation. 
Second, it suggests that the endurance of these dogmas results 
from the research-practice gap, which may be addressed through 
evidenced-based practice. We furthermore suggest an agenda for 
transitioning to EBP, which necessitates substantial changes 
including better empirical training for academics, more academic 
credit for writing systematic reviews and greater focus on 
evidence in peer-reviewing, publication, standards, curricula and 
bodies of knowledge. 
In this paper we have pointed to empirical evidence that 
contradicts four common SE assumptions, to raise awareness of 
dangerous dogmas. We recognize that there may also be some 
empirical evidence to support these core assumptions. Our paper 
will have succeeded if it stimulates researchers to examine the 
empirical evidence for these assumptions, both for and against, 
and reach a conclusion about their validity; in other words, if 
researchers are inspired to carry out a SLR and contribute to 
evidence-based practice. Further research should also investigate 
other core assumptions and non-empirical concepts in SE.  
Some feel that empiricism has, in principle, a quite limited role in 
SE research (e.g. [112]). If SE wants to be, and to be regarded as, 
a scientific discipline, such positions bode ill indeed. Empiricism 
is one of the fundamental characteristics that distinguishes science 
from pseudoscience [113], [114]. Without embracing empiricism, 
SE will likely continue to rely on dogma instead of well-founded 
theories that are supported by evidence. Without fostering 
evidenced-based practice, SE will likely continue to flounder in 
the gap between what ought to work and what actually works. 
Continuing to foster non-empirical concepts and weakly validated 
technologies and practices may lead to widespread belief that 
most SE is pseudoscience and eventually to marginalization of the 
entire community.  
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